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THE RETAIL PAPER PURCHASER AND THE
PROCEEDS LIEN
J. EDWARD COLLINS*
One of the numerous ways by which a retailer may double
finance is by accepting a down payment on the conditional sale of
an article floor-planned by an inventory financer, transferring the
conditional sales contract and note to a financing agency other than
his inventory financer, and keeping the proceeds of both transactions
without any accounting. The resulting battle between the two financ-
ing agencies he could enjoy if not worried as to whether he was to
be indicted for his behavior. While, strangely enough, the litigation
between two such financers has been somewhat sparse, the cases lack
neither dramatic nor legal interest. Can the retailer be considered
a pirate of the inventory financer's business? Should the retail fi-
nancer be protected as the holder of a negotiable specialty? These
are some of the questions raised by the problems in this area.'
A recent Michigan case, Dart National Bank v. Mid-West Cor-
poration,2
 presents the problems in a rather interesting posture. Here
the retail financer sought to replevy a house trailer which had been
the object of trust receipt financing undertaken by the defendant
inventory-financing entruster. Pursuant to a statement properly filed
under the Michigan Uniform Trust Receipts Act,' a trust receipt was
issued, in which the retailer-trustee agreed not to sell the trailer, until
full payment was made of the amount due the entruster. In complete
disregard of the trust receipt, the retailer sold the trailer under a
conditional sales contract to a good faith purchaser who turned in
art old trailer as down payment, and gave the usual negotiable note
secured by the conditional sales agreement for the balance. The note
and agreement were negotiated and assigned to the plaintiff bank
under a warranty that the trailer was free of all liens and encum-
brances save the interest of the conditional purchaser. On learning
of the transaction shortly thereafter, the entruster, who of course
had not been paid, talked the purchaser into surrendering the trailer
to him and caused the return of the trade-in. In its defense to the
replevin action, the entruster contended that the bank acquired no
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, A.B. 1934, LL.B. 1937,
Boston College; LL.M. 1938, Cornell.
I See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J.
1057 (1954) ; Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 59 Yale L.J. 1209 (1950).
2 356 Mich. 574, 97 N.W.2d 98 (1959).
Mich. Comp. Laws,	 551.401-555.419.
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interest, in the trailer because the retailer had agreed under the trust
receipt not to sell the property•until the &um secured'had been paid,
and further because the bank was not a good faith purchaser, it
having made no inquiry of the retailer as to whether any liens were
outstanding against the trailer. The court disposed of the latter point
by finding that such an' inquiry, in view of the warranty contained
in the contract, would have been fruitless. This was the first trans-
action between 'the bank and the retailer, and the bank had no actual
knowledge of the existence of 'the trust receipt transaction.
A major battle ground under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in
inventory-financer versus retail-financer litigation has centered about
the applicability of Sections 9 and 10. Section 9 gives a good faith
purchaser from the trustee of negotiable or quasi-negotiable instru-
ments,' • arising out of the conditional sales transaction, rights 'free
of the interest o£' the 'entruster; despite complete compliance with
the statutory requirement for the filing of the entruster's interest.
Section 10 affords' to the entruster "to .the extent to which and as
against' all classe's' of persOns as to whom his security' interest was
"valid at the time of disposition the trustee" the proceeds 'of goods
sold by ,the . truStee,'other than in compliance with the terms of the
trust receipt agreement.5 Not 'surprisingly, diverse results' have been
had in the caseslargely• dependent upon whether the individual court
has read • SeCtion 9 or 10 to' be controlling. While, mathematiCally
more courts seem' to have favored protection of the retail rather than
the. inventory financer, there can hardly be said to be any reeognizable
'majority 'on either side of the question'.°
,	 .
In the present litigation, the' court ignored previoUs Michigan
cases dealing 'with 'the rights of a financing agency of a dealer who
sells in violation of the terms of the financing agreement,' decided
prior to or apart froM the Uniform Trust Receipt Act,' and concerned
4 Section' 9(1) (a) 'deals' with the rights of pufchasers from a trustee of negotiable
instruments and documents as well as of " . . . instruments in such form as are by com-
mon practice purchased and sold as if negotiable.... ." See Gilmore, supra note . 1,
pages' 1102-1107.
5 This is subject to the limitation that the proceeds must be received by the trustee
within. ten days of a . demand by the entruster for a prompt accounting. Knowledge
on the part of the entruster of the existence of proceeds for ten days without demand
for an accounting constitutes a waiver by the entruster of his rights in' the proceedi.
6 Skilton, Cars For Sale: Some Comments on the Wholesale Financing of Auto-
mobiles, 1957 Wis. L. Rev. 352, 422.
1 In National Bond & Investment Company iv. Union Investment Company, 260
Mich. 307,. 244 N.W. 483 (1932), autos covered by a floor mortgage plan were' sold.
The financer of the conditional sales contract and transferee of the contract and -note
was held to acquire only the rights of the conditional vendee and to be Subject to the
interest of the mortgagee. . . .
In the later case of Fidelity Corporation v. Associates ,Discount Corporation, 340
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itself solely with the interpretation of the Act. , In so doing, the
decision can hardly be said to be helpful. The Court quotes Section
10 only to ignore it; and reaches its conclusion by finding that the
note, despite its reference to the conditional sales contract, was nego-
tiable under the NIL and Section, 9(1) (a). By Section 9(1) (b) the
note is to be. considered the equivalent , of the trailer entrusted to
the retailer. Back, to Section 9(1)(a), the. note-now-trailer having
been taken: from the retailer by the bank for value An. good faith,
it is held free by the bank of the entruster's' interest. The same con-
clusion is then 'reached by the court with respect to the 'conditional
sales 'contract. It iis an "instrument" as defined by Section • of -the
Act, being a credit instrument; it becomes the equivalent of the
trailer '.under Section 9(1) (b), and by Section 9(1)(a) the condi-
tional , sales..agreement-now-trailer is held free of the entruster's in-
terest, it having been taken..by :the. bank in the manner customary
for instruments which by common practice are purchased and sold
as "if negotiable".
While the end result of the decision is not undesirable, and its
conclusion probably unassailable in the absence of Section 10, the
court has obviously failed to come to grips with the latter section
(possibly for the reason that these two sections appear irreconcilable
in this context). Consequently the case is something less than satis-
factory in view of the decisions which have protected the entruster
by recognition of the proceeds lien provided for by Section 10. 8
The Uniform Commercial Code deals with the subject in Sections
9-306 and 9-308. By the former section a lien is given to the inven-
tory financer on the proceeds of installment sales, the lien encompass-
ing the conditional sales contracts and other "chattel papers". In
the hands of the retailer they are subject to the entruster's security
Mich. 610, 66 N.W.2d 235 (1954), the floor plan mortgage gave the mortgagor-
retailer the right to sell for cash or credit terms approved by the mortgagee. The
conditional sales contract under which the retailer sold the mortgaged cars was as-
signed to a financing agency without recourse. No payment having been made by the
retailer to the mortgagee, an unsuccessful attempt was made to have the finance com-
pany declared a trustee of the receipts of the conditional sales contract. By looking
at the "realities of the transaction" the court found the retailer received the same
amount of money as if there had been a cash sale, and that it should be treated
as the equivalent of a sale for cash. Consequently, the purchaser of the sales contract
was protected.
8 General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Associates Discount Corporation, 38
N.Y.S.2d 972 (Syracuse Munic. Ct, 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 267 App. Div. 1032,
48 N.Y.S.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1944) ; Canandaigua National Bank & Trust Company v.
Commercial Credit Corporation, 135 N.Y.S.2d 66 (4th Dept 1954), reversing 204
Misc. 946, 126 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1953). For a variation of the problem of the
nature of the entruster's interest under Section 10 see In re Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135
F. Supp. 863 (D.C. Tenn. 1955).
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rights. By Section 9-308; however, the financer of the conditional
sales agreement who purchases the retail paper from the trustee by
giving "new value" for it is protected as against the•original inventory
financer, with respect to the note (which is presumably in negotiable
form) whether he has knowledge of the entruster's security interest
or not if he takes in the ordinary course of business, and with respect
to any non-negotiable instruments only if he has a lack of knowledge
of the entruster's outstanding interest, and in addition takes in the
ordinary course of buMness. Both sections having been extremely
carefully drafted with full cognizance of the difficulties of interpre-
tation experienced under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and both
sections having been completely re-written in 1957, it is anticipated
that the major problems of interpretation have been eliminated.
Under these sections the result reached in Dart National Bank v.
Mid-West Corporation has been preserved.
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